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INTRODUCTION 
The European integration process has been serving two central goals since the 
Second World War: increasing security and prosperity for Europe – this is one 
of the most common answers to the question of why European states continue to 
integrate and the union itself keeps enlarging. In those two central goals the 
integration process has generally justified its founders’ expectations. Supra-
national institutions have been growing stronger during the half century and the 
union’s economic development has been remarkable. Uniting Europe and the 
convergence of less developed territories have been new and additional tasks, 
with growing importance. The successful integration and convergence of pre-
vious non-democratic states and societies has been more complicated. Public 
support for integration ideas has not always been there when needed and this 
has also influenced the popularity of enlargement.  
Deepening and widening have been two cornerstones of European inte-
gration: deepening of its common policies and widening of European Union 
(EU) borders. Both offering added value and both creating several risk 
scenarios and dilemmas. In some periods deepening and widening progressed 
simultaneously or were both absent, and in some periods these two processes 
were seen as alternatives to each other to keep European integration developing. 
Not all member states have supported both enlargement and deepening – when 
founding members have mostly preferred deepening then first-round new-
comers United Kingdom (UK), Denmark and Ireland often found enlargement 
the better option. Greece, Spain and Portugal, which joined later, have often 
been against enlargements and using new accession rounds to get more 
privileges and resources. Austria, Finland and Sweden have moved back to the 
original integration ideas, where European integrity and clear conditions should 
be central components of the accession process. 
The enlargement process has remarkably influenced the nature of the EU 
over 60 years and six enlargement rounds, and the Community (EC) of the 
founding six members has grown to the present EU with 27 members. Enlarge-
ments have been different in all key aspects: enlargement rounds have ranged 
from one to ten candidates, lasted from three to up to ten years, have been based 
on clear agendas and criteria or depending mainly on bilateral diplomacy. At the 
same time general membership conditions, which were defined by the founding 
Treaties of Paris and Rome, were quite brief and remained unchanged until the 
fifth accession round.  
The function and profitability of enlargements has been more of a concern 
for the hosting union and its member states than for applicants. At the same 
time original integration ideas have offered more guidelines and models for a 
deepening aspect, while enlargement as a process has been analysed and 
conceptualised less. Accordingly the first enlargement rounds were based on 
general neo-functional integration logic. The accession experience of Greece, 
Spain and Portugal indicated that additional theoretical and methodological 
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input is needed for a successful and effective enlargement process. Previous 
experience with neo-liberal colonial relations leads to different models’ condi-
tionality and the build-up of European pre-accession positive conditionality.  
Conditionality is generally considered as a theoretical method explaining the 
logical relations between two or more international relations actors (Killick 
1998, Smith 2003). Conditionality can be seen in that sense as a norm or 
institutional agreement. Defined as “a mutual arrangement by which a govern-
ment takes, or promises to take, certain policy actions, in support of which an 
international financial institution or other agency will provide specified amounts 
of financial assistance” (Santiso 2001: 8), it can be based on the belief that 
assistance will produce cumulative progress as if growth-forced reforms create 
political support and political support allows the reforms and modernisation to 
continue (Fierro 2003: 95). 
At the beginning of the 1990s, the wave of new democracies and enthusiastic 
candidate states brought new challenges, obligations and dilemmas to the existing 
EU. The situation, offering from one aspect a historical opportunity to remove the 
old borders of the Cold War, demanded additional efforts from the EU, as the ten 
new applicants were more than all the previous enlargements together. The EU 
was more prepared for an enlargement than ever before, after experiencing both 
successful and complicated pre-accession processes in previous rounds. The fifth 
enlargement also changed the importance and role of positive conditionality by 
making it a central concept in the pre-accession process. The belief that the 
upcoming enlargement may cause problems for the existing Union led to the 
building of a sophisticated conditionality. The costs and difficulties were seen as 
manifold, and a dilemma was sometimes noticed between the enlargement and 
internal efficiency. Accordingly, the fifth enlargement offered a superb example 
for evaluation and development of a positive conditionality model. Positive 
conditionality paired with the Copenhagen Criteria was seen as an ideal model of 
pre-accession, consisting of clear criteria, transparency, mutual interest and high 
convergence efficiency (Hay and Menon 2007: 140).  
The growing practical importance of positive conditionality has also increased 
the academic debates in the field. Researchers are focused mostly on questions of 
efficiency, legitimacy and sustainability, analysing which preconditions are 
needed and which principles must be followed to succeed. The recent EU pre-
accession experience allows for developing a traditional positive conditionality 
theory dominated by cases of aid and development cooperation partnership (the 
most well-known is Tony Killick’s “Aid and the Political Economy of Policy 
Change”, 1998) to a more universal concept. Traditional studies of positive 
conditionality conducted by Paul Collier (1997) and Carlos Santiso (2001), which 
are mostly based on cases of African or Caribbean countries with weak economic 
and institutional development, focusing on governance efficiency, policy 
implementation and overall conditionality efficiency, are in the EU context more 
valuable when used in European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) initiatives instead 
of enlargement policy. The studies of Frank Schimmelfennig and Ulrich Sedel-
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meier have added a specific European dimension to conditionality studies, by 
focusing on the importance of values like “community”, “identity” and 
“solidarity” during conditional relations (Schimmelfennig 1999, Schimmelfennig 
and Sedelmeier 2007). Karen E. Smith has added the dynamic aspect to 
conditionality studies by researching “The Evolution and Application of EU 
Membership Conditionality”. She is also focusing on the motivational aspect in 
her research while describing the relationship between imposers and target 
countries developed in mutual cooperation (Smith 2003). Critical studies of 
positive conditionality (e.g. Fierro 2003, Burnside and Dollar 1997) focus on the 
efficiency aspect. Research has indicated that on the international arena there is 
no direct relationship between aid flows and policy reform. 
A theoretical debate on the values and logic of enlargement and pre-acces-
sion is going on between traditional camps of neo-functionalists, neo-liberal 
imperialists, intergovernmentalists and neo-institutionalists. Here the question is 
mainly, which of these theoretical models explains positive conditionality the 
most logical way? Helen Sjursen (2002), Robert Cooper (2003) and Jan 
Zielonka (2006) have been debating the philosophical nature and roots of 
positive conditionality after the 1990s, by asking which values have been 
behind the rhetoric and practical implementation of pre-accession conditio-
nality. Robert Cooper (2003), for example, stresses the importance of accepting 
the de facto situation with different levels of socio-economic development, 
which causes double-standardisation and asymmetric relations between the 
parties of accession process. Jan Zielonka (2006) on the other hand offers a 
broader philosophical view of the logic of the enlargement and post-en-
largement situation through a neo-imperial prism in his “Europe as Empire; the 
Nature of the Enlarged European Union”. 
Practical enlargement circumstances are at the same time already challenging 
the existing studies of positive conditionality mainly based on Central and Eastern 
Europe (CEE) experience. New candidate states Albania, Bosnia-Herzegovina, 
Iceland, Serbia and FYROM are making use of the universal approach of positive 
conditionality complicated. Accordingly the previous researches with the focus on 
special circumstances of the CEE and based on the experience of 1991–2004 (for 
example Heather Grabbe 2001) are gradually losing their practical importance. 
What will this dissertation add to the scholarly field of positive conditio-
nality? The practical need for additional research is caused by low efficiency of 
conditionality implementation during the last 50 years. Most of the conditional 
framework created by the UK, United States of America (USA) and Soviet 
Union (USSR) has failed in the long run to achieve their goals in political and 
economic terms. The EU pre-accession positive conditionality has been one of 
the rare cases openly seen as a success story, but both the environment for 
conditionality and target countries profile is changing, making success more 
complicated with every year. Accordingly positive conditionality itself needs 
changes and is already changing. The main question is how to make the changes 
so to contribute to broader European values, with existing practical reality. 
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Research questions  
This dissertation offers an in-depth analysis of the theoretical nature and 
practical use of the positive conditionality tool as an EU pre-accession instru-
ment, especially in the fifth and sixth accession rounds. As a part of the analysis 
and conclusions this dissertation also indicates on-going developments in the 
positive conditionality model and its role in the EU enlargement policy in the 
future. It combines different methods based on historical observation, the case 
study approach, comparative analysis, statistical analysis and text analysis, with 
the central research goal of explaining the logic, theoretical roots, practical 
efficiency and motivation of EU pre-accession positive conditionality. 
The main research questions throughout the papers are the following: “What 
are the main pre-conditions and components that make positive conditionality 
effective?”; “Has the use of positive conditionality been based on similar 
principles during the accessions?”; “Has positive conditionality caused faster 
reforms and convergence in candidate states?”; “What were the main motivators 
of the EU’s pre-accession conditionality and what influence has this had on the 
accession process?”; “How has the EU’s positive conditionality influenced 
policy-making in applicant countries during pre-accession?” and “What have 
been the long-term consequences of pre-accession positive conditionality for 
target states?” These research questions have been thoroughly examined in the 
following individual papers published in the period of 2004–2012, which also 
form the core of the current thesis. 
To start, the first paper (“Conditionality and Dependence as Key Elements in 
Simultaneous Democratization and Crisis Prevention”) has a focus on the logic 
and efficiency of positive conditionality as a tool for the EU accession and 
neighbourhood policy. It aims to analyse the advantages and disadvantages of 
positive conditionality when used as an EU pre-accession and ENP component. 
Comparative analysis covers four test cases (Estonia, FYROM, Moldova and 
Georgia) offering both different levels of conditionality and different social 
outcomes. It analyses why some target states agree and succeed with conditio-
nality, while others with similar starting points decide to reject the conditional 
relationship. In the final part the paper questions about the possibility of 
positive conditionality becoming the principal model of EU security policy. 
The second paper (“European Union’s Positive Conditionality Model in Pre-
accession Process”) analyses the evolutional aspect – the development of the 
pre-accession conditionality concept during the whole of EU history. The idea 
to study the dynamics of conditionality applications during the various EU 
accession rounds is provoked by the often-repeated claim from the fifth pre-
accession round of negotiations that all member states have followed the same 
conditions and criteria to accede to the EU, as it is the fastest and most effective 
way to enlarge. This argumentation has also laid ground for justification of 
unbalanced conditional relations between the EU and candidate states. Here the 
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applied method is observation and process-tracking, by searching for specific 
components indicating the existence and level of positive conditionality. 
The third paper (“The EU Neighbourhood Policy, Positive Conditionality 
and Reforms in the Former Soviet Space”) focuses on the question of the effi-
ciency and profitability of positive conditionality from the perspective of the 
target country (both for the candidate states and ENP states, respectively). 
According to the common understanding, conditionality has been seen as the 
“golden carrot” for both sides as well as the best possible choice for target 
countries in terms of social and economic development to catch up to the 
existing member states. This paper draws on a comparison of the socio-econo-
mic indicators between member states and applicants in the beginning of pre-ac-
cession conditionality and in the year of accession. It examines the socio-eco-
nomic effects of positive conditionality in terms of convergence (catching up) 
of the existing member states by testing if the gap between existing member 
states and candidate states narrowed during the pre-accession conditionality, or 
not. 
The fourth paper (“Relevance of Copenhagen Criteria in Actual Accession: 
Principles, Methods and Shortcomings of EU Pre-accession Evaluation”) 
analyses the practical implementation of positive conditionality while focusing 
on the levels of the transparency, impartiality and objectivity of the European 
Union pre-accession assessments. The main aim is to scrutinise whether the EU 
follows its own official criteria in its progress reports or if the evaluation is 
dominated by institutional and national interests. It compares selected candidate 
countries’ progress reports prepared by the EU Commission with the assess-
ments of seven other respected research centres: the International Monetary 
Fund (IMF), the World Bank (WB), Freedom House, the Bertelsmann Foun-
dation, Transparency International, Fraser Institute and the Heritage Foun-
dation. While combining text analysis with comparative evaluation and semi-
quantitative measuring tools the paper outlines differences in measurements and 
their practical impact on the eventual enlargement decision. 
The fifth paper (“Navigating between Policy and Populace: Estonia, its 
Accession Referendum and the EU Convention”) is a case study on practical 
reflection of pre-accession conditionality in the national political system of one 
applicant state (Estonia). It focuses on the decision and policy-making processes 
involved in the EU’s Convention in the context of a candidate country. Rather 
than a macro-analysis of the functioning of the Convention as a whole, this 
contribution focuses on actors on the national level to show how their involve-
ment in the Convention on the EU level interacts with domestic constraints. 
While using the process-tracking approach, this paper examines the way 
politicians from a candidate country navigated the challenge of formulating a 
substantive European policy, while at the same time being concerned about the 
approval of EU accession itself. In this way it contributes to our understanding 
of how political leaders in CEE have learned to bridge these dual roles of 
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playing a part in European politics, while simultaneously explaining Europe at 
home. 
The sixth paper (“Life in Post-Communist Eastern Europe after EU Membership: 
Estonia”) is a case study about the outcome of applied pre-accession positive 
conditionality in the post-accession Estonia. It takes the socio-economic 
changes under the focus (measured in GDP/capita, unemployment and inflation 
figures, participation in civil society, social security and healthcare indicators) 
in the period of 2004–2010. It is based on the statistical method and compa-
rative analysis, where Estonia’s development is compared to and contrasted 
with the reference bases provided by earlier periods and also with the develop-
ment of other member states and the EU average. 
This introductory chapter makes an attempt to map the conceptual basis of 
positive conditionality, its main values, principles and components. It then 
covers the main debates on positive conditionality, critical aspects and recent 
trends in its development. It also elaborates the main theories influencing and 
explaining the practical enlargement process and conditionality, which values 
were central for actors and which models contributed the most in this respect to 
the debate and development of pre-accession positive conditionality. Finally, it 
draws some important conclusions that are based on the research findings and 
that contribute to the existing knowledge about positive conditionality effects 
on the EU enlargement process. 
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THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK 
The essence of conditionality  
Conditionality is often described as the “stick and carrot” approach, where both 
negative and positive motivators are possible (Smith 2003: 58), but conditio-
nality itself has no clear connections to any set of values or ideology. There are 
different ways to categorise and measure conditionality (see e.g. Collier 1997, 
Killick 1998, Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier 2004, Schimmelfennig and 
Sedelmeier 2005, Sedelmeier 2006). Negative conditionality aims to influence 
the already existing situation (for example trade regime or diplomatic relations), 
which is promised or threatened to be changed if the target country does not 
meet certain requirements. Negative conditionality implies imposing sanctions 
such as reducing, suspending or terminating benefits if the state in question does 
not comply with the criteria. A complicating aspect of negative conditionality is 
that it needs political consensus and the capability to carry through sanctions 
and the supportive attitude of third countries (Fierro 2003). 
Positive conditionality is technically more complex than the negative one, 
but can be implemented gradually and without a broad consensus (about its 
central components, see Killick 1998, Smith 2003, Fierro 2003). The motivation 
to use positive conditionality is thus to cause greater social, economic or 
political influence, while avoiding costlier or more dangerous methods (Fierro 
2003: 95). Positive conditionality is quite demanding for its pre-conditions, as it 
can only succeed in a situation where the awaited benefits of the receiving party 
are greater than the cost of the adjustments (Sjursen and Smith 2004). 
Positive conditionality is based on the belief that assistance will produce 
cumulative progress and growth: forced reforms create political support and 
political support allows for continuing with reforms and modernisation. Positive 
conditionality has an ex ante nature. While negative conditionality aims at 
influencing an already existing situation that is threatened to be changed, posi-
tive conditionality is oriented to changing the current situation not satisfying the 
donor side (Fierro 2003: 100). Here the starting situation does not satisfy one 
party (imposer) and it motivates the other actor to change it. Influence is usually 
based on actors’ promises to provide certain resources or rewards, whenever the 
recipient country succeeds in meeting the conditions.  
Voluntarism and expected mutual benefit are the specific aspects, making 
positive conditionality different from the other forms of conditionality. The 
conditionality goal is equally satisfactory to both sides of the partnership. 
Positive conditionality is a peaceful method, with no resort to force, even in 
cases where the target country fails to fulfil any of the conditions. In cases 
where the target country fails to follow the conditionality, the promised reward 
is withheld, but the state imposing the conditions does not intervene either 
coercively to change the cost-benefit assessment of the target government by 
inflicting additional costs (Mitrany 1966, in Nelsen and Stubb 1998: 112). 
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One-way shared sovereignty is a controversial aspect of positive conditio-
nality as, according to international law, a country can lose its statehood by 
starting to share sovereignty. Certainly, the status of statehood is different when 
sharing is a mutual as opposed to only a one-way process. Successful states take 
a stake from others’ sovereignty, but refuse to share their own power (Keohane 
2002: 748). Policy-makers may certainly have an alternative view. To quote 
Geoffrey Howe, “Sovereignty is not like virginity, which you either have or you 
don’t /.../ It is a resource to be used, rather than a constraint that limits our 
capacity for action” (Howe 1990 in Keohane 2002: 749). Will that state, willing 
to share its sovereignty, receive in return a common sovereignty shared by 
others and to what extent will it be able to influence this new “joint 
sovereignty”? In terms of European integration positive conditionality is based 
on the precondition that countries are able and willing to share some of their 
sovereign rights but in accordance with their national interests (Kelstrup and 
Williams 2000: 23) . 
To ensure the success of a conditional relationship, the target country is 
often demanded to share its legislative and executive power with special 
agencies created by an imposing side. It means creation of executive and 
controlling bodies protected from local public opinion and the political elite. 
Their aim is to reduce the threats of political competition to the success of 
conditionality, by promoting meeting the conditionality as a prioritised national 
interest, above “political games” (Mitrany 1966, in Nelsen and Stubb 1998: 
108–109). These bodies are not subordinated or responsible to national 
authorities of the recipient but influence the process via the donor’s executive 
agencies. Sharing power with the representative offices of a conditionality 
imposer also causes the reduction of sovereignty and democracy in the target 
state (Hay and Menon 2007: 141). As strengthening democracy in many cases is 
the central goal of positive conditionality, it creates a controversial situation, 
where a democratically elected parliament needs to share its power with non-
elected international agencies, with the eventual goal of building stronger 
democracy (Stiglitz 1998: 10–11). 
The asymmetric nature of relations between the independent states refers to 
an extraordinary practice which is built around an absence of equality and 
reciprocity; transposition necessity of legal acts; and absence of option for opt-
outs to the target state (Fierro 2003: 95). The absence of equality and recipro-
city does not mean that the parties agree that each of them has a different legal 
status. The sides just agree on different obligations and control rules, but do not 
define their legal status. The recipient country has no right to demand from its 
contractual partner anything other than the agreed compensation. The party that 
grants the benefits, on the other hand, has an obligation to give the reward if the 
conditions are fulfilled. Conditions are offered as a package, without the 
possibility of selecting components. This approach can in practice lead to a 
situation where actors are not referring to adopting the acquis communautaire 
but simply to taking acquis (Nello 2002: 202). 
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When negative conditionality demands are usually clear and offer practical 
ground to measure success, then positive conditionality on the contrary tends in 
practice to have qualitative criteria of success, or not to have any clear, 
measurable criteria at all (Anastasakis and Bechev 2003: 8). Target levels and 
performance indicators may not even be properly qualified, measurable or 
reasonable concerning starting situation. Accordingly, target countries cannot 
evaluate themselves as they do not have a fixed target and are fully dependent 
on the donor’s evaluation (Santiso 2003). The absence of sufficient and clear 
criteria is motivated to appear in situations where the donor is not fully 
interested in fulfilment of the conditions or not interested in admitting that the 
criteria are fulfilled (Schimmelfennig, Engert and Knobel 2006). Installing 
additional non-contractual demands into conditionality frameworks is a delicate 
process, as the imposing side needs to have instruments to enforce fulfilment, 
but at the same time to keep it out from the official list of requirements 
(Boughton 2006: 19; in Ranis, Vreeland and Kosack 2006). 
The need for harmonisation of legal acts and bureaucratic procedures also 
highlights the question of possible cultural and ideological harmonisation. Even 
when cultural and ideological aspects do not find their way to official 
agreements both of them influence the fulfilment of official criteria. For 
example, the demand to create a full market economy (2nd Copenhagen Criteria) 
requires compliance with liberal ideology among policy-makers, and the 
transition to pluralist democracy (1st Copenhagen Criteria) presumes the 
introduction of pluralist and democratic values in the target countries. In some 
cases, “imposed Europeanisation” is seen as a sort of cultural harmonisation and 
the opposite value of nationalism (Farell, Fella and Newman 2002: 161–162). 
 
 
Debate on positive conditionality 
When conditionality models are selected and evaluated, mostly the “efficiency” 
variable is seen as a central one. Efficiency in any practical case of conditio-
nality depends on the expectations of the imposing side: if the goal is achieved 
with planned resources, conditionality has been successful. Conditionality goals 
can differ both in the economic and political aspects, have a short or long-term 
perspective, or be motivated by moral and psychological aspects (Killick 1998, 
Santiso 2001, Fierro 2003). Concentration and detailed action plans can add 
efficiency in a problematic environment but will also raise the costs (Gwin and 
Nelson 1997: 10). 
Use of conditionality has often been legitimised with the argument that 
assistance and cooperation will cause faster progress. Practical experience 
before 1991 however did not support this logic, as most studies indicated 
disappointing results of positive conditionality (Killick 1998: 8–9). Insufficient 
starting conditions were seen most often as the reason for failure and therefore 
hope that positive conditionality method would work when pre-conditions are 
met remained. Conditionality works more efficiently in a developed environ-
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ment, but is usually far more needed in an underdeveloped environment. 
Accordingly the imposing party faces problems either with reasonability or the 
results (Santiso 2001). A practical problem is that there are very few target 
countries that have both a good policy environment and will to follow external 
conditional pressure (Collier 1999: 319). 
The criticism of the positive conditionality is based on four main aspects: 
sustainability, legitimacy, morality and popular support. All the critical aspects 
are based on practical starting circumstances that the target countries have 
accepted the positive conditionality model often only after they have gone 
through some internecine warfare or have lost all the other alternatives for fast 
modernisation and economic growth. Thus, conditionality is often interpreted 
by public opinion and political elite as the “second worst choice”, which could 
be revisited in case of better economic and political circumstances (Anastasakis 
and Bechev 2003: 4–5). 
Economically conditionality is often not sustainable as public spending and 
financial assistance tends to free up budget resources, which can then be 
allocated to alternative purposes. As a result, it becomes critical to assess and 
influence the overall quality of government spending, including budget and 
public finances management, rather than focus on sectoral spending as the 
importance of external aid is growing simultaneously with growth of public 
spending (Collier, Guillaumont, Guillaumont  and Gunning 1997: 1401). 
The legitimacy and popular support problem can be summarised as the “you 
cannot buy policies” approach. Limitations on conditionality are seen as caused 
by unwilling recipients. It consists of factors that undermine the readiness of the 
recipient to implement the reforms combined with a lack of credibility of the 
donor or reasoned by monitoring difficulties (Sjursen and Smith 2004). High-
level dependence also tends to weaken democratic governance when the 
imperatives of assistance management supersede the requirements of domestic 
decision-making (Santiso 2001). Conditionality thus encourages the “rationalist 
and unheroic” arts of bureaucratic compromise rather than the heroic stance of 
the visionary (Keohane 2003). In a situation where positive conditionality 
produces very little public popularity, can it still have value for the national elite 
during modernisation, as the most of painful reforms can be introduced as 
conditionality components “where government does not have a choice”. 
Jürgen Haberman’s (2007) model of deliberative democracy process can also 
partly explain the changes of the EU’s conditionality nature, even when open 
public debate is avoided. Accordingly the final balance point between 
obligations and rewards will be found as a result of rational arguing between 
sides, how to make conditionality as smooth and motivated as possible. It 
means that target countries do not find the load of conditions problematic if it is 
legitimised by additional funding (Habermas 2007). 
Regarding the question of sustainability, the main problem of positive 
conditionality is that if conditionality underestimates the development of 
domestic forces that would lead to good policies in the long run, then it has 
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served only to promote better short-run policies while contributing to the post-
ponement of more fundamental home-grown reform efforts (see e.g. Burnside 
and Dollar 1997). Even if the conditionality is able to solve an immediate 
commitment problem of the recipient, this long-term effect is still a potential 
problem. Conditionality is sometimes also used to promote policies that for one 
reason or another tend to become irreversible once they are introduced. 
Building up a long-term and stable political culture requires that there be no 
competitors to the democratically elected government. The influence on the 
economic system can have the same effect: special rules and donations of the 
imposer will draw the target country away from the normal regional market 
situation, or build up a new economic system based on yearly donations and 
support (Collier, Guillaumont, Guillaumont  and Gunning 1997: 1406–1407) 
Moral and economic arguments form a dilemma in which the conditionality 
imposer has to make progress-based decisions on whether to increase or 
decrease the support in the future. From the moral point of view additional 
funds are needed where the progress and development levels are the lowest and 
if the purpose is social development, and there is no moral justification to 
sanction target states’ society for government’s lack of progress. But such 
reasoning and action will inevitably send a message that less progress ensures 
more financing and in the long run will reduce the progress (Sjursen and Smith 
2004). Progress-based conditionality, in which additional financing is provided 
to the countries that have progressed faster and have a higher living standard, 
will once again raise the question of why target countries that actually manage 
better than comparable target countries should be supported. 
Despite the low efficiency of the political conditionality, the popularity of 
this method was growing in the 1990s. This may have been caused by even 
lower cost-efficiency of military intervention measures compared to earlier 
periods, multilateral nature of the international arena and a will to follow a non-
violent line by some international actors. Among the alternatives, positive 
conditionality seemed to offer the highest level of mutual security and stability 
between the partners (Ferrero-Waldner 2006). In the 1990s multilaterals were so 
eager to propose so many different conditionality sets for the CEE states that, 
after accepting their conditions, there was very little room left for independent 
foreign, financial and social affairs (Hay and Menon 2007: 140–141). 
What is the additional value of positive conditionality in the context of 
European integration and enlargement policy? The main motivation to use 
positive conditionality was to safeguard and control the accession process. The 
fear that the possible enlargement could cause problems for the existing union, 
plays a key role in building the sophisticated accession conditionality. 
Especially in the fifth enlargement, costs and risks in financial and legal terms 
were considered to be so high (by existing member states and the EU 
institutions), that it was sometimes seen as a dilemma between the union’s 
enlargement and its internal efficiency.  Accordingly additional measures were 
sought to reduce the risk (Witte 2002: 236). 
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THEORETICAL MODELS EXPLAINING  
POSITIVE CONDITIONALITY 
Theoretical models explaining the positive conditionality and enlargement logic 
are varying and combined both between the different accession rounds and also 
inside every single round. In terms of enlargement and pre-accession progress 
neo-functionalism, neo-liberal imperialism, neo-institutionalism and inter-
governmentalism have been the main models to explain the goals and values 
behind the technical use of positive conditionality. It is of course a separate 
question of how much policy-makers actually followed theoretical models when 
designing positive conditionality to meet their practical needs. The aim of the 
theoretical comparison is to make an introduction to one of the central questions 
of research: which of the main theoretical models has played and is playing a 
central role in defining the ideological nature of pre-accession conditionality? 
 
Neo-functional theory in terms  
of EU enlargement and positive conditionality 
The neo-functionalist integration theory has been one of the prevailing theories 
explaining the integration processes in Europe since the end of the Second 
World War. Functional and neo-functional logic is formed around the simple 
proposition that the provision of common need can unite people across nations 
and borders (Mitrany 1975, Rosamond 2000: 60). Its main value is the ability to 
explain the dynamic logic of integration and actors’ motives to integrate more 
deeply and widely (Eilstrup-Sangiovanni 2006: 24–28). There are several 
theories (intergovernmentalism, institutionalism, transactionalism, etc.) next to 
neo-functional theory capable to provide alternative explanations, yet neo-
functional theory has been able to operate with all the fields and periods of the 
practical integration process in Europe (Kelstrup and Williams 2000; Griffiths 
and O’Callaghan 2004). 
The traditional functional ideas of David Mitrany from “A Working Peace 
System” (1943) were combined by the practical solutions of Jean Monnet and 
Robert Schumann during the actual integration process and additionally fulfilled 
with the theoretical contributions of Leon Lindberg, Karl Deutsch and Ernst 
Haas at the end of the 50s and early 60s (Nelsen and Stubb 2003). From the 
very beginning, neo-functional models paid more attention to enlargement 
motivation and principles due to practical necessity.  
The use and efficiency of the neo-functional model in the enlargement 
context is seen as limited by the need of interdependence between the actors. 
The bigger the integrity and interdependence is, the more motivated participants 
are for additional integration, and accordingly applicant countries that depend 
more on integrated partners have more motivation for fulfilling the conditions 
(Zielonka 2006: 45–48; Delors 1989, in Nelsen and Stubb 1998: 59). The 
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central interest in keeping the neo-functional integration process progressively 
spreading is the will to gain additional welfare – as sustainable political 
integration needs successful economic integration as a pre-condition to gaining 
the support of the public and elite (Mitrany 1975 in Nelsen and Stubb 1998: 
180–181). 
Utilitarian reasoning and freedom from ideological influence is a central 
principle of neo-functional integration theory. Integration models and activities 
should not involve ideological or cultural goals – the main criteria for policy-
making are welfare and the stability in society. Neo-functionalist authors 
monopolise the position of utilitarian ideology by trying to mix it with the 
efficiency of the Webberian bureaucracy model (Deutsch 1957 in Nelsen and 
Stubb 1998: 131–132). 
Supranational institutions are needed to grow political integrity and efficient 
integration (Wiener and Diez 2004: 64–66). These institutions have a dominant 
role in agenda-forming, legislation, execution and control and their competence 
and privileges have been growing during the integration process. In first stages 
these bodies worked in cooperation with nation states and their representatives, 
and later these bodies started to take over the role of national democratic 
institutions. This non-democratic system was justified as an effective way to 
collect experts into institutions and defend them against the turbulence of 
political groups and voters. 
The legitimacy of neo-functional integration is based on mutual benefit and 
voluntarism. Violence, pressure or sanctions are not used for setting up and 
developing an integrated union. Long-lasting integration is based on the as-
sumption that countries and citizens join the integrated union voluntarily, 
without any coercion or violence. Their main motivation is functional – to 
achieve a higher standard of living, more income and a peaceful society. Inte-
gration should be a complete win-win game where all the participants are in 
every stage sure that they will benefit through additional deepening or 
widening. The pre-accession framework also works in the principle of volun-
tarism but also in a limited way (Eilstrup-Sangiovanni 2006: 46–48). 
The level of integration, the areas of integration and methods are 
progressively developing. Integration should not only go deeper and wider, but 
also do so progressively. The spill-over effect also indicates that integration is 
not a development level but a process. The process starts from the economic 
area but is finally targeted at the political and social area (Etzioni 1965: 4). The 
message of the neo-functionalist theory is that policy-makers need to pay 
attention to economic integration and if it is successful, political integration will 
follow it. Every new enlargement should start on a more advanced financial and 
technical level and integrate the acceding countries faster (Haas 1964: 12–14). 
When motivated, candidate countries are ready to prioritise activities related to 
accession and delegate their sovereignty as much as asked by supranational 
bodies. 
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Participants agree mutually on the delegation of their sovereignty to a 
supranational level, where it will be used in common interests. Sovereignty is 
shared mutually (using mostly federal principles), and every member state, 
when sharing its sovereignty, can enjoy the advantages through other countries 
sharing their sovereignty. States still keep their sovereignty in the question of 
“competence of competence”, which means that additional sovereignty can be 
transferred only based on a consensus (Milward 1994: 11–14). Pre-accession 
sovereignty sharing should follow the same logic, if following neo-functionalist 
ideas. 
One-speed union as a central goal is achieved through harmonisation and 
standardisation. The logic of the integration is built on the idea of speeding 
convergence between different territorial areas and high economic development 
of all the regions (Weiler, Begg and Peterson  2004). The regions or the union 
itself are not divided into centre, semi-periphery or periphery. The aim is to 
develop a universally highly developed area. During the integration, when the 
economic resources accumulate, the speed of convergence will also grow. 
Equally high development is achieved by legal harmonisation and standar-
disation. Legal harmonisation is achieved by joint legislation on the supra-
national level and cooperation between national lawmakers, which should 
produce a logical and integrated legal space. 
As integration is a relationship between equal countries and is based on 
functional logic, there is originally no cultural harmonisation or pre-conditions 
in the ideological aspect (Rosamond 2000: 67). Neo-functional theory does not 
include supremacy of any ideological model – its purpose is to replace the 
ideological governance. Administrative harmonisation is at the same time an 
important component of the process, as it ensures efficient legal harmonisation 
and should contribute to the growth of security and economy. 
The enlargement policy follows the same logic, the best functional solution 
must be found considering the costs and the efficiency of both parties, less 
developed areas should receive proportionally higher support to ensure 
convergence (Nelsen and Stubb 1998), and the fastest inclusion and progress 
will lead to the fastest actual convergence. A more motivated environment for 
both sides during pre-accession will lead to faster and more effective accession, 
which serves the interests of both sides. Therefore, in practice it would be 
reasonable to support transparent, guided and motivational enlargement 
conditions and assessment, based on actual progress as widely as possible 
(Bomberg and Stubb 2003: 189–191). The functional arguments have been one 
of the most important motivators in designing enlargement principles in 
practice; as a result the EU-related activities became priorities in applicant 
states and helped to solve local problems. Public support was also often gained 
by the joint argument that all the efforts would be later compensated by a higher 
standard of living. The belief in European values also legitimised the process of 
harmonisation. Even when the candidate countries did not understand the 
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purpose of every legal act, there was a strong belief that it was a need to gain 
welfare (Sjursen 2002: 495). 
Where is the connection between the conditionality and neo-functional 
logic? Functional arguments to use conditionality are mainly based on 
utilitarian logic. Tony Killick (1998) for example points out that there is no 
need to look for justification for harder and asymmetric structural positive 
conditionality, as, according to earlier experience, this is far more effective than 
soft conditionality, ex-post conditionality or negative conditionality. Intensive 
structural components make positive conditionality less risky for those 
imposing them and financially more attractive for the target country, as both 
sides benefit through faster results and deeper changes in society. If faster and 
deeper reforms or convergence are needed even more radical measures are 
justified (Killick 1998: 6–10). Even if donors’ interests were served more than 
those of the applicants, it was part of a mutually beneficial partnership. 
Neo-functional logic is dominant in practical implementation of positive 
conditionality in the case where the centre or imposer dominates the agenda, but 
is doing it for the benefit for the whole community, by developing first the areas 
with a lower development level (as the average of the community can grow 
fastest by developing the weakest) and redistributing resources based on 
economic efficiency. Participants will not only be treated equally by sharing the 
same rules and standards, but the weakest ones even receive advantages to catch 
up to the average development level (Deutsch 1957, in Nelsen and Stubb 1998: 
137). Central administrative and supranational institutions rule and legislation 
for all areas of union are safeguarded, no double-standardisation used. This 
process, based on neo-functional ideas, will be dominated by a functional–
administrative centre quite independent from policy-makers in member states 
and financed by the transnational economic elite.  
 
Neo-liberal imperialist explanation in terms of EU 
enlargement and positive conditionality 
Neo-liberal imperialism is based on the original works of J. A. Hobson (1965) 
and developed by Karl Kautsky (1964), Johan Galtung (1971), Paul Baran 
(1975), Harry Magdoff (1978), Jan Zielonka (2006) and Robert Cooper (2003); 
has been seen as alternative way to explain European integration, finding more 
support in the recent decade. Neo-liberal imperialism is based on the idea of 
functionality and is motivated by the economic reason that occupation is not 
practical in economic terms (Viotti and Kauppi 1993: 453). Neo–liberal 
imperialism includes the central idea of imperial theory of building and keeping 
a relationship of effective domination and control, political or economic, direct 
or indirect of one (or more) nations over another(s) (Chilcote 1994: 251). Neo-
liberal imperialism has had an advantage over traditional imperialism in the 
context of European integration, as it has concentrated mainly on gaining 
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welfare by grabbing resources and markets, when classical forms of realism are 
concentrated on direct political dominance, occupying and conquering 
territories. 
The connection between neo-liberal imperialism and positive conditionality 
is built around the concept of dependency, which is a pre-condition for positive 
conditionality and neo-liberal empire (Baran 1957). Central components of the 
EU pre-accession positive conditionality: dependence, integration and 
conditional relationship all tend to have a negative effect to nation-building and 
the development of democracy as well as support for neo-imperial domination 
(Binder 1964: 629–630). In practice it appears in frameworks of western 
multilateral organisations (IMF; WB, EU) where both models are used 
simultaneously. 
According to this theoretical approach, the main economic effect is based on 
the existence of different economic zones (centre, semi-periphery and 
periphery) inside the imperial entity having specialised economic roles. The 
zones are not a purpose in itself but serve the economic interests of the capital 
holders (Chilcote 1994: 253). Economic zones inside the empire are vital as the 
central problem of highly developed centre of an empire is in keeping long-term 
sustainable profit during inevitably growing surpluses of capital and rising 
labour costs, and lowering efficiency of production (Rothbard 1995). As every 
zone serves a specific function, they cannot replace each other’s functions. Even 
when re-distribution of resources is in favour of the centre and there is no 
support for convergence (Galtung 1971: 83) none of the zones are interested in 
losing their economic specialisation and advantages in partnership. The equal 
development is not seen as a purpose or even a reasonable situation (Hobson 
1965). A multi-speed approach should be agreed to by both of the parties, the 
centre and distant areas, as it is the only possible combination where both 
parties can profit from cooperation (ibid). The centre is also constantly 
redistributing resources to avoid rapid development of periphery and semi-
periphery, and accordingly no convergence appears even when all zones of the 
empire are more productive (Viotti and Kauppi 1993: 452–454). 
Voluntarism and mutual economic interest to participate are central com-
ponents of neo-liberal empires. Neo-liberal imperialism can be seen as a 
voluntary cooperation method between states and regions as there is no straight 
military pressure to participate, but there is a strong economic and political 
reasoning. Cooperation is based on the precondition that the target country is 
economically less developed than the empire and also economically and 
politically dependent from the empire, and therefore unable to sustain the 
possible pressure. Accordingly the motivation of the neo-functional theory and 
neo-liberal imperialism overlaps in central aspects – to make economic profit 
and enjoy welfare without using violence. Neo-liberal imperialism, differently 
from traditional imperialism, relies on peaceful methods and voluntarism of all 
participants (Zielonka 2006: 53–55). The centre is motivated by capital 
efficiency, semi-periphery by creation of jobs and investments into the industry, 
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periphery relaying to growing market of the raw resources. Voluntarism of 
peripheral areas can also be based on a lack of alternatives for some areas of the 
empire (Galtung 1971: 81). 
In terms of political power neo-liberal imperialism is based on one-way 
sharing of sovereignty, where only the peripheral areas are sharing their 
sovereignty, but have almost no access to the centre’s sovereignty or political 
power and no federal structures with clear distribution of power are established, 
either (Magdoff 1978). The centre of the neo-liberal empire is not aimed to 
reduce self-determination or sovereignty by improving the status of distant 
territories. The centre is interested in a politically and administratively sustain-
able business environment, but their interference goes only as far as it is needed 
for economic profit. If the peripheral areas are relatively developed in political 
and administrative terms, the changes concern mainly harmonisation of the 
legal space, but in case of need the centre can also initiate deeper reforms on 
social, administrative and political levels. At the same time the symbolic and 
formal independence of the periphery is often respected (Hobson 1965, Cooper 
2003: 38–39). 
Double-standardisation and lack of measurable criteria of cooperation is not 
based on two sets of official standards, but on the centre privilege not to follow 
some standards and norms (Baran 1975). Conditions for partnership in the neo-
imperial empire consist of a formal transparent part and an unofficial part. 
Officially the sides confirm mutual will for cooperation and openness for 
flexible solutions in practice. Even after fulfilling the partnership or member-
ship criteria the double standards can continue as not all privileges are shared 
among all zones. Both the imposing centre and distant areas find no need to ask 
which principles and interests dominate the process, and whether it is legiti-
mate, as the interests of the centre or union are dominant, but also welcomed 
and followed by the national elites of the target countries. Target areas usually 
do not bring about the question of the neo-imperial nature of the process, as 
being afraid of a possible negative reaction (Zielonka 2006: 33). 
Neither the semi-periphery nor periphery can have remarkable input for the 
empire’s cultural heritage (Farell, Fella, Newman 2002). Administrative, 
cultural and ideological harmonisation is motivated by economic reasons, as 
higher profitability can be achieved by a standardised legal environment and 
less corruptive governance. Transposition in this case means transfer of legal 
acts with slight adjustments to ensure their practical efficiency. During the 
transposition process the best possible solution is not the central aim, but the 
fastest on cheapest way of making the legal environment and social rules as 
similar as possible. In some cases it can include the official goal of copying 
“imperial best practice” or it is introduced at the grassroots level (Chilcote 
1994: 251). Often these processes are described as the voluntary initiative of the 
target state or even as signs of progress (Zielonka 2006: 54–55).  
When positive conditionality is designed according to neo-liberal impe-
rialism, the centre (imposer) is leading in the cooperation agenda, using it for its 
26 
own benefit, sharing only the rules and standards with target states or territories, 
treating these territories as second standard partners and redistributing the 
economic resources in favour of the centre. Soft cultural and administrative 
harmonisation is supported in target areas. Partnership represents the interests of 
the economic elite – transnational companies and bigger member states. The 
periphery or acceding states participate in bases of necessity or situations 
without better alternatives. The centre creates a conditionality system serving its 
long-term economic and political interests to dominate the region. For the 
existing union and member states, one of the main purposes of enlargement 
would be to new markets and labour forces, and to secure long-term gains 
through institutional agreements. The candidate states are offered a significantly 
weaker package of benefits, but are forced to follow most of the regulations and 
directives, leading to additional costs or loss of competitiveness (Zielonka 2006: 
35).  
As seen in comparison, neo-imperialism and neo-functionalism have most of 
the key components overlapping in terms of integration logic and methods. The 
main difference is that in case of neo-imperial motivation the economic tools, 
legal norms and execution serve the centre's economic interests; in the neo-
functional case the same tools will be used to benefit the whole community and 
especially the weakest member states. 
 
Intergovernmentalist model in terms of  
EU enlargement and positive conditionality 
The intergovernmental model is seen as the main alternative to the neo-
functionalist concept of supranationalism, when explaining EU integration. The 
intergovernmentalist model is based on broader neo-realist theory and explains 
the integration process as member-state-centric bargaining and competition, 
where other (supranational) actors play a minor role or represent national 
interests. According to the intergovernmental model, national interests are 
dominant over institutional or idealist interests and states have the power to 
block or regulate the speed of the integration process. The political priorities of 
the states overcome the administrative rules and criteria and also the economic 
interest of the interest groups. States do not need to obey non-state supra-
national actors and interest groups. National identity and original state 
sovereignty are seen as the main sources of loyalty and legitimisation (Hoffman 
1966: 862–905). Integration and cooperation projects are methods to force 
competitive states into an ineffective or harmful situation. Joint institutions just 
represent the interests of the most powerful member states. The economic gains 
of integration or enlargement are important only as long as these do not threaten 
states’ sovereignty (Moravcsik 1998: 35–38). 
According to the intergovernmental model the main obstacles in the 
integration process are the national elites, who can lose their political and 
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economic importance during successful integration (Wiener and Diez 2004: 78). 
They will be supported by historical-cultural ideas of nation-state, autonomy 
and competition with neighbours. Participating states use all their power to be 
dominant and grow their power over the weaker actors inside the federation-like 
union as well, as all social processes take place in a “zero-sum game” where for 
every winner there must be a loser. Integration and cooperation projects are 
methods to force competitive states into a non-effective or harmful situation. 
Joint institutions just represent the interests of the most powerful member states 
(Farell, Fella, and Newman 2002: 147). 
The intergovernmental model is sceptical about sustainable integration or 
long-term cooperation between competing nations. Short-term forms of 
cooperation are seen as a manoeuvre to gaining an advantage in the “balance of 
power” model. Accordingly states should not create supranational bodies with 
“competence of competence” and allow them to set the agenda in crucial policy 
fields (Wiener and Diez 2004: 83). Policy-making and setting the priorities is 
dominated by the participating states and is the result of their competition. 
International organisations, supranational actors of international law play un-
important roles in the process (Moravcsik 1998). 
Intergovernmentalism can also be seen as an “anti-theory”, explaining why 
integration is not sustainable and not developing, so it offers less attention to the 
dynamic process of integration and accession. Intergovernmentalism also does 
not offer bases to research the role of conditionality led by a supranational 
institution (the European Commission) (Nugent 1999: 495). The intergovern-
mentalist model is also mainly interested in individual member states, while the 
overall number of members is growing and every single state plays a decreasing 
role in the enlargement process, while the role of supranational bodies like the 
European Commission is growing. By rejecting the idea of joint interest and 
supranational influence during enlargement, intergovernmentalism simply does 
not have enough tools to be an active participant in the debate of European 
integration (Eilstrup-Sangiovanni 2006: 212). 
According to the intergovernmental model most existing member states 
should tend to follow realistic arguments and national interests, when designing 
the pre-accession assessment system based on the principle that the economic 
and political gains of accession are important only as long as these do not 
threaten states’ sovereignty or statehood (Moravcsik 1998: 35–38). The inter-
governmentalist argument in explaining the enlargement process is that, even in 
case enlargement in general might be costly, it can be very beneficial for some 
states, by opening new markets or taking away resources and attention from 
policy areas that they want to block (institutional reform, Schengen and the 
euro). Member-state-centric bargaining, where other actors play a minor role, 
appears more strongly in the final stages of policy formulation, when different 
member states start demanding additional conditions in exchange for their 
support (Wiener and Diez 2004: 88). For example, in case of the pre-accession 
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process during the fifth and sixth enlargements it appeared as criticism and 
demands in the non-Copenhagen questions in annual EU progress reports. 
In case of the dominance of the intergovernmental model in practical im-
plementation of positive conditionality, only limited transfer of sovereignty to 
supranational institutions appears. Political agendas (and criteria) will be 
dominated more by national interests than the general interests of community or 
even the integrated centre. The same logic concerns economic aspects, the level 
of regulation is low and re-allocations of economic resources are not influential 
or systematic, but are based on political compromises and necessities (Milward 
1994: 11–15). Accession conditions would be a mixture of the central interests 
of existing member states (only represented by central institutions), reflecting 
their will to save their political position, economic power and profit by using 
the resources of new member states. During the conditionality political aspects 
play a greater role than clear and measurable criteria.  
Accordingly, this model in some aspects overlaps with neo-liberal impe-
rialist logic, with three important differences: first, the centre does not dominate 
the agenda-setting process; second, as conditions and rules are not integrated 
and representing controversial interests they do not produce significant re-
allocation of economic resources and are not bases for membership selection; 
third, in neo-liberal imperialism the target area’s interest opposes imperial 
interests, and there is no competing national interests inside the empire. 
 
 
Neo-institutional model explaining  
EU enlargement and positive conditionality 
The importance of the neo-institutional approach is growing with the expansion 
of EU legislation, institutional size, traditions and norms (Stevens and Stevens 
2001: 14). Neo-institutional aspects in European integration have been re-
searched by Aspinwall (2003), Caporaso (1999), Pollack (2005), Schneider 
(2003) and Jupile (1999). The neo-institutional model offers a possible 
explanation to European integration and enlargement based on the institutional 
and administrative dominance of the policy-making process. Decision-making 
in an institutional environment is dominated by habits, procedures, norms and 
compromises that prefer expectable, rational, continuing, regulated and less 
risky choices. Rules and norms tend to be dominant over idealist goals and 
broader gains (Hall and Taylor 1996: 938). The neo-institutional decision-
making system can be seen as an evolutional set of norms and restrictions 
chosen and developed by active policy-makers, consisting of influential 
networking and standardised solutions. 
In neo-institutional reasoning administrative and legal reasons are dominant 
over economics and politics, and small administrative solutions guide bigger 
political choices, not vice versa. The institutional model also consists of the 
logic of bargaining situation, where existing policy-driving institutions use 
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policy areas for improvement of their positions (Eilstrup-Sangiovanni 2006: 
194–195). Neo-institutionalism also explains independent and intervening 
variables that crucially affect actors' strategies and goals in the integration 
process (Eilstrup-Sangiovanni 2006: 194). Economic or political concerns get 
less attention as agenda-building is dominated by administrators. Official rules 
and procedures start to dominate, changing the starting goal of the process (Hall 
and Taylor 1996: 940). 
The neo-institutional model and conditionality also overlap in support of 
sharing sovereignty and using conditions to encourage the “rationalist and un-
heroic” arts of bureaucratic compromise. In a situation where positive conditio-
nality produces very little public popularity, can it still have value for the 
national elite during modernisation, as the most of painful reforms can be 
introduced in period of conditionality and without risking with public support. 
During this process, leading institutions tend to choose secure and compromise 
solutions instead of following the original goals of the process. This is 
motivated by every unit’s interest in not taking additional challenges or risks, 
but rather in preferring slower and inefficient approaches to securing their 
personal position. It causes delays and rising costs during the process (Beach 
2005). In later stages institutional actors can start manipulation of data and rules 
to go even further with process control and risk reduction. 
Neo-institutionalism also approaches political processes from the point of 
view of appropriateness, i.e. following the rules, habits, and rational choice 
from among the morally acceptable options. The norms and formal rules of 
institutions will shape the actions of those acting within them. “Compliance 
occurs in many circumstances because other types of behaviour are incon-
ceivable; routines are followed because they are taken for granted as ‘the way 
we do these things’” (Eilstrup-Sangiovanni 2006: 194–195). “Path dependence” 
is on well-known model inside institutional theory. The cognitive element of 
new institutionalism suggests that individuals make certain choices because 
they can conceive of no alternatives (Pierson 1996). Inside the neo-institutional 
model the rational choice concept plays an important role as it explains the 
formulation of values and principles in the cooperation process between 
national and supranational actors. In terms of supranational agents and Euro-
pean integration the main interests are focused on the questions of why 
legislative policy-makers are delegating their agenda-setting power to inflexible 
institutional bodies and how “joint decision traps” influence policy formulation 
(Eilstrup-Sangiovanni 2006: 195). 
In terms of European integration and enlargement process, it is evident that 
the interests of separate institutions can be (and often are) different from the 
general long-term interest of the EU – accession has often become a vital 
component in the institutional competition (Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier 
2002). Acceding states can also have institutional motivation for partnership, as 
hoping that accession will bring a set of social habits, traditions and regulations 
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that will lead to a “good life” and all the efforts of harmonisation will later be 
compensated with higher standards of living (Sjursen 2002: 495). 
In the case of the dominance of neo-institutional motivation in pre-accession 
positive conditionality implementation, the centre or imposer is dominant over 
the values of agenda formulation and policy-making, with the key aspect being 
that not a political, but an administrative level provides the agenda priorities (in 
forms of criteria and conditions). The structural and personal motivation 
towards security and status quo are the bases for the legal and economic actions 
of the institutions. In the majority of cases it means supporting the powers that 
already have control over political and economic resources: transcontinental 
companies, bigger member states, and supranational institutions. New member 
states or small companies only have disadvantages in the eyes of neo-
institutional decision-makers, as they do not control the political process or 
possess economic power. Accordingly, the criteria and conditions finally tend to 
reflect the interests of the existing centre and ruling powers (Moravcsik 1998: 
26). Neo-institutionalism differentiates from neo-functionalism and neo-liberal 
imperialism as the central motivation of policy makers is security and status 
quo, not economic gains or political power. Accordingly, groups with neo-
institutional motivation will support groups that control political and economic 
resources and represent reasonable standardised habits. In practice, neo-
institutional groups tend to be policy- takers; they can support either neo-
functional dominance or the neo-liberal imperialist model depending on, which 
group offers more secure and more comfortable solutions. But essentially they 
are not about to support newcomers to the club, especially when they are 
economically weaker than existing club members. The ideas of convergence 
and equality are also not supported as disturbing existing allocation of power 
and resources. 
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FINDINGS AND CONCLUSIONS 
Positive conditionality has found intensive use by the European Union during 
the last 20 years in the fields of enlargement, neighbourhood policy and 
development cooperation. It has also been in the process of remarkable change 
during the period 1993–2011. Papers compiled in this doctoral thesis map and 
analyse the central aspects and development of pre-accession positive 
conditionality during the years 1993 and 2011.  
The first paper (“Conditionality and Dependence as Key Elements in 
Simultaneous Democratization and Crisis Prevention”) revealed that conditio-
nality was not equally successful in all the cases even when the target countries 
were quite similar. A clear connection was found between the efficiency of 
conditionality and the commitment of the target area. Accordingly, positive 
conditionality cannot be seen as a universal toolbox widely used in the enlarge-
ment process and implementing neighbourhood policy because without 
“efficient sticks and attractive carrots” available target countries become 
disillusioned and unmotivated. The overall results of conditionality were 
directly dependent on possible positive outcomes, such as possible membership, 
increased financial support and economic growth; yet as a pre-condition 
sufficient economic dependence needs to exist. 
The second paper (“European Union’s Positive Conditionality Model in Pre-
accession Process”) debates the aspect of the historical legitimacy of pre-
accession positive conditionality. It showed that positive conditionality has not 
been used in similar terms during the six rounds of accession. On the contrary, 
the level of conditionality has varied during the enlargement history of the EU – 
no positive conditionality was used or attempted in the first accession round, 
and minor aspects of positive conditionality were attempted but not 
implemented in second enlargement round. Minor aspects of positive 
conditionality first appeared in practice during the third accession round, but 
were once again absent in the fourth enlargement. During the fifth enlargement 
the highest level of positive conditionality appeared, as it became “naturalised” 
from the very beginning of this accession round. During the sixth enlargement 
positive conditionality again started to lose its central role in some aspects. To 
sum it up, the use of positive conditionality has been growing during the 
enlargement history but it has not been an inevitable part of enlargement. It 
means that the often-repeated claim that “we have all followed the same 
conditionality to accession” does not hold. On the contrary, only the least 
developed and later acceded countries have had the obligation of following 
positive conditionality (fifth and sixth-round countries). 
The third paper (“The EU Neighbourhood Policy, Positive Conditionality 
and Reforms in the Former Soviet Space”) focuses on the question of the 
necessity, efficiency and profitability of positive conditionality from the 
perspective of the target country. It appeared that positive conditionality 
applications were justified in some fifth-round applicant countries, whereas 
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treating all the applicants the same way was not justified. In terms of economic 
development half of the candidate states were able to progress faster than the 
EU average whereas the rest were developing more slowly than or equal to the 
EU average. The effect of positive conditionality was fully negative in mea-
sured labour indicators, as unemployment in all candidate countries was 
growing faster than the EU average. In terms of inflation the effect was 
overwhelmingly positive, as only in Malta and Cyprus did inflation show a 
slower decline than the EU average; all the other applicant states showed faster 
progress than the EU average. In many ways the development of applicant 
countries was slightly faster than the EU average, but not all of them managed 
to make positive conditionality work for their own social and economic 
development. 
The fourth paper (“Relevance of Copenhagen Criteria in Actual Accession: 
Principles, Methods and Shortcomings of EU Pre-accession Evaluation”) 
analyses the practical aspects of positive conditionality when implemented in 
candidate countries, focusing on the levels of transparency, impartiality and 
objectivity of the EU pre-accession assessments. The paper revealed the 
existence of contradictory evaluation methodologies in EU pre-accession 
conditionality. In cases of Croatia and Romania, the European Commission’s 
evaluation results differ systematically from the calculated average of the 
impartial evaluators. The difference was also influential, as it was changing the 
actual standings in the pre-accession scoreboard. Apparently, the Progress 
Reports used by the European Commission did not serve their initial purpose – 
to select candidate countries and evaluate their progress, but also to justify 
political reality, which demanded the acceptance of Romania and Bulgaria and 
the rejection of Croatia despite the actual conformity with the Copenhagen 
Criteria. 
The fifth paper (“Navigating between Policy and Populace: Estonia, its 
Accession Referendum and the EU Convention”) is a case study from the pre-
accession positive conditionality period in Estonia. The aim of the paper was to 
research the influence of European integration and conditionality on small 
candidate states with limited resources. It became evident that EU pre-accession 
conditionality was seen as the highest priority of national policy-making. It led 
first of all to reduction of the role of national legislative and executive powers, 
public opinion and debate in general during the process and second of all to 
participation in the European Future Convention being handled with the re-
sources available after pre-accession activities and national election cam-
paigning. Accordingly, the Estonian example indicated that universal conditio-
nality during pre-accession creates additional pressure on their administration 
and starts to withdraw human resources from other areas of external relations in 
addition to national policy-making. As a result small states in this situation have 
a dilemma of whether to accept a lower speed of pre-accession, lower efficiency 
in defending national interests or sacrificing their capability in other policy 
areas. 
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The sixth paper (“Life in Post-Communist Eastern Europe after EU Membership: 
Estonia”) studies the influence of pre-accession conditionality in the aftermath – 
during the first years of actual EU membership by using again the Estonian 
example. It demonstrated that successful EU policy and fulfilment of all the 
criteria were seen as the highest national priorities. When EU conditions 
conflicted with existing interests or positions, the latter were changed. 
Considering historical circumstances and the comparative progress of its Baltic 
neighbours, Estonia’s transition process is internally seen as a success story, at 
least in the opinion of local policy-makers and also by most of the electorate. 
On the other hand, Estonian transition choices have been quite specific, 
including radical currency reform, fast privatisation and “shock therapy” during 
the pension reform. Many of these reforms were motivated by the wish to join 
the EU and NATO as fast as possible and to fulfil the accession criteria and 
conditionality as the best pupil in the class of candidate states. As a result, 
Estonia finds itself at the top and bottom of most scoreboards where the fastest 
economic growth is combined with the weakest social protection, respectively. 
In terms of Estonia’s role in EU policy-making, brief membership experience 
and restricted reforms have allowed it mainly to act as a “policy taker”.  
What conclusions one can make based on these research findings? First, 
positive conditionality has not been a consistently used concept during the EU 
enlargement. In the very beginning it appeared in minor areas and was 
rediscovered only in the fifth enlargement starting in the 1990s. Only then 
(1993–2006) one could notice the positive conditionality application in full 
technical complexity, influence and importance. 
Second, the values and goals forming positive conditionality have been 
changing from the dominance of neo-functionalism, to the growing influence of 
neo-liberal imperialism and neo-institutionalism. While policy-makers point 
rhetorically often to neo-functional ideals, the policy-making outcome re-
sembles a combination of neo-institutional motives and neo-imperial values. 
The change towards neo-liberal imperialism is not easy to explain, as the neo-
institutional or intergovernmental models seem to better serve the growing 
interests of member states and EU institutions. 
Third, the best results with positive conditionality were achieved in the field 
of enlargement and during the fifth accession round. Conditionality provided 
positive convergence effects in most candidate states, but the difference was not 
extraordinary and not all the candidate countries managed to use it for effective 
social and economic transition. Despite optimistic tone, the fifth and sixth 
enlargements were the longest in history and even after more than ten years of 
preparation Romania and Bulgaria were the poorest applicants to ever accede to 
the EU. It leads to the conclusion that either the convergence of target countries 
was not the central goal of imposers or conditionality simply did not fulfil 
expectations of target countries. The efficiency of positive conditionality ap-
peared to be highly sensitive to the sufficient motivation and commitment of both 
sides, and destined to succeed only in case of mutually respectful cooperation. 
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Fourth, the opinion of the target countries about conditionality has been 
neither negative nor fully positive; however, most candidate countries have 
welcomed positive conditionality. Those being critical tend to see the EU 
operating in a neo-imperial manner while using the Copenhagen Criteria 
selectively and in their own interests to justify the opening or closing of the 
accession process. Indeed, one can conclude that actual accession often depends 
more on political interests and decisions, while the assessment procedure as a 
part of the conditionality instrument serves only as a tool of justification and 
legitimisation. 
And last but not least, the future of pre-accession conditionality seems less 
promising today than five years ago when the last enlargement took place. As 
enlargement has lost actuality for the crisis-ridden EU, so has the pre-accession 
conditionality become redundant for the Eastern and Southern neighbours of the 
EU. The lack of “efficient sticks and attractive carrots” does not create incentive 
enough for change. 
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SUMMARY IN ESTONIAN 
Positiivse tingimuslikkuse tähtsus ja  
mõju Euroopa Liidu laienemispoliitikas 
Laienemisprotsess on viimase kuuekümne aasta jooksul Euroopa Liitu (EL) ja 
sellele eelnenud Euroopa Ühendusi märkimisväärselt muutnud, arvestades, et 
ühenduse loonud kuue riigiga on tänaseks liitunud veel kakskümmend üks uut 
liikmesriiki. Laienemised on olnud erinevad pea kõigis aspektides: kandidaat-
riikide arv on varieerunud ühest kümneni, liitumine on põhinenud nii riikide-
vahelisel diplomaatial kui ka põhjalikel kirjapandud reeglitel ning kestnud 
kolmest kümne aastani. Samas on laienemise eesmärgid, põhimõtted ja 
ametlikud reeglid säilinud üsna ühetaolisena kogu Euroopa Liidu eksistentsi 
vältel. 
Eesti jaoks olid laienemisprotsessi olulisimad aastad 1993–2004, mil 
laienemispoliitika põhimõtete ja tingimuste mõistmisest sõltus meie enda liitu-
mise võimalikkus, tempo ja tingimused. Just antud perioodi alguses, 1993. aas-
tal Kopenhaagenis Euroopa Ülemkogul, kujunes laienemispõhimõtete keskseks 
loogikaks nn. positiivne tingimuslikkus, mis määratles kandidaatriikidele sea-
tavate tingimuste sisu, kriteeriumid, koostöövormi ja EL-i toetuse liitumis-
eelseks perioodiks. 1990. aastate alguses iseseisvunud, demokratiseerumisprot-
sessi läbinud ja EL-ga ühineda soovivate riikide arvukus ning ulatuslik refor-
mide vajadus olid kesksed ajendid positiivse tingimuslikkuse väljakujunemises. 
Üksteist aastat hiljem, aastal 2004, mil kümme uut liikmesriiki ühinesid EL-
ga, tõdeti varasemale liitumisprotsessile tagasi vaadates, et positiivse tingimus-
likkuse ellukutsumine oli osutunud üle ootuste edukaks ning seda nähti ka 
edaspidi laienemispoliitika keskse mudelina. Positiivse tingimuslikkuse kasuta-
mist laiendati ka EL-i naabruspoliitikasse ning arengukoostöö poliitikasse. Järg-
miste liikmekandidaatide ja naabruspoliitika sihtriikide kaasamine ei osutunud 
paraku edukaks, mis omakorda tõstatas vajaduse positiivset tingimuslikkust kui 
meetodi toimimise eeltingimusi, loogikat ja keskseid muutujaid täiendavalt ana-
lüüsida. Uurimine on seda vajalikum ja ajakohasem, et möödunud kahekümne-
aastane positiivse tingimuslikkuse aktiivse kasutamise periood on pakkunud 
sobiva empiirilise pagasi, mille põhjal mudelit arendada ning tänastele prak-
tilistele vajadustele kohandada. 
Käesoleva artiklitel põhineva doktoritöö eesmärgiks on pakkuda positiivse 
tingimuslikkuse toimimise loogika ja motiivide analüüsi ning teoreetilisi täien-
dusi EL-i laienemispoliitika kontekstis. Uurimus otsib vastust küsimustele, 
millised huvid, väärtused ja motiivid suunasid positiivse tingimuslikkuse kuju-
nemist ning millised teooriad suudavad selle arengut kõige veenvamalt seletada. 
Doktoritöö moodustavad artiklid kasutavad kombineeritud metoodilisi lähene-
misi, analüüsimaks EL-i positiivse tingimuslikkuse teoreetilisi juuri, ajaloolist 
arengut, praktilist toimimist ja selle sisemist toimeloogikat. Lisaks analüüsivad 
artiklid EL-i viienda ja kuuenda laienemisringi spetsiifilisi aspekte süvitsi ning 
annavad hinnangu EL-i väärtuselisele arengule laienemispoliitika näitel. 
39 
Doktoritöö sissejuhatav peatükk debateerib peamiste integratsiooniteooriate 
suutlikkuse üle EL laienemispoliitika positiivset tingimuslikkust kujundada ja 
seletada. Peatükk annab esmalt ülevaate positiivse tingimuslikkuse peamistest 
komponentidest, põhimõtetest, kriitilistest aspektidest, dilemmadest ja arengu-
test. See kaardistab peamiste integratsiooniteooriate komponendid ja põhiteesid 
ning analüüsib positiivse tingimuslikkuse peamiste komponentide kattuvust 
erinevate integratsiooniteooriate laienemist puudutavate teesidega. 
Doktoritöö publikatsioonide esimene artikkel („Conditionality and Depen-
dence as the Key Elements in Simultaneous Democratization and Crises Pre-
vention”) analüüsib positiivse tingimuslikkuse toimeloogikaid EL-i laienemis-
poliitika ja naabruspoliitika eesmärkide seisukohast. Kasutades võrdlevat mee-
todit, analüüsib artikkel tingimuslikkuse sihtriikide dilemmasid esitatud tingi-
muslikkusega nõustumisel või sellest keeldumisel, Eesti, Gruusia, Moldova ja 
Makedoonia näitel. Artikkel juhib tähelepanu positiivse tingimuslikkuse kasu-
tamise riskidele ja piirangutele ning sellele, milliseid eeldusi ja kriitilisi 
muutujaid positiivne tingimuslikkus vajab, olemaks efektiivne vahend julge-
oleku kindlustamisel ja demokratiseerimise läbiviimisel EL-i välissuhetes. Uuri-
musest järeldub, et tingimuslikkuse tulemuslikkus sõltub eelkõige sihtriigi moti-
vatsioonist, mis omakorda sõltub eelkõige nn „lõplikust auhinnast”. Neil juhtu-
del, kus motivatsioon on ebapiisav, ei paranda efektiivsust ka strukturaalsed 
meetmed ega finantstoetused. 
Teine artikkel (“European Unions Positive Conditionality Model in Pre-
Accession Process”) vaatleb ja analüüsib EL-i laienemispoliitika positiivset 
tingimuslikkust ajaloolisest ja evolutsioonilisest aspektist. Siin tõusetub küsi-
mus, kas ja kuivõrd on EL laienemisringide jooksul kasutanud positiivset tingi-
muslikkust samadel põhimõtetel ja samas ulatuses? Artiklist selgub, et posi-
tiivse tingimuslikkuse kasutamine EL-i laienemispoliitikas on olnud ebaühtlane 
ja ebajärjekindel, mis saavutas olulise tähtsuse alles viiendaks laienemisringiks. 
Seega ei pea paika viiendas laienemisringis kasutatud õigustus, et kõik 
liikmesriigid on pidanud täitma sarnaseid laienemiseelseid tingimusi. Artikkel 
toob välja, et varasemate laienemiste käigus ei pidanud EL positiivse tingimus-
likkuse kasutamist otstarbekaks ja õiguspäraseks, mistõttu seda olulisel määral 
ka ei rakendatud. 
Kolmas artikkel (“The EU Neighbourhood Policy, Positive Conditionality 
and Reforms in the Former Soviet Space”) jätkab positiivse tingimuslikkuse 
praktilise mõju uurimisega. Artikli läbivaks teemaks on positiivse tingimuslik-
kuse kasutamise põhjendatus ja selle kasulikkus sihtriikidele. Sellest uurimusest 
selgub, et positiivse tingimuslikkuse intensiivistunud kasutamist alates viiendast 
laienemisringist ei saa põhjendada kõigi Kesk- ja Ida-Euroopa kandidaatriikide 
nõrkade majanduslike ja ühiskondlike näitajatega, küll aga olnuks õigustatud 
positiivse tingimuslikkuse kasutamine viienda laienemisvooru nõrgimate riikide 
(eelkõige Bulgaaria ja Rumeenia) suhtes. Sotsiaal-majanduslikust aspektist 
lähtuvalt oli positiivse tingimuslikkuse mõju ebaühtlane, soodustades küll 
näiteks inflatsiooni kahanemist, aga samas ka tööpuuduse kiiremat kasvu. 
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Summas ilmnes positiivse tingimuslikkuse sihtriikidel keskmisest vähemal mää-
ral (alla ühe protsendi aastas) kiirem majanduskasv võrreldes EL-i liikmes-
riikide keskmisega. 
Neljas artikkel (“The Relevance of Copenhagen Criteria in Actual Ac-
cession: The Principles, Methods and Shortcomings of EU Pre-accession 
Evaluation”) keskendub EL-i laienemispoliitika ning positiivse tingimuslikkuse 
hindamisprotsessi mõõdetavusele, läbipaistvusele ja erapooletusele. Uurimus 
analüüsib EL-i laienemisotsuste kujundamist kandidaatriikide suhtes ning 
väidab seda, et EL-i laienemisvalikud on mõjutatud paljuski liikmesriikide ja 
EL-i institutsioonide omahuvist. Uurimuse käigus kõrvutati Euroopa Komisjoni 
ametlike kandidaatriikide hindamisraporteid teiste rahvusvaheliste hindajate 
analoogsete töödega. Sellest võrdlusest ilmnes, et ühelt poolt on Euroopa Ko-
misjoni hindamismetoodika olnud piisavalt sarnane teiste hindajate metoo-
dikaga, pakkumaks vajadusel objektiivset hindamist. Teisalt on mitmetel juhtu-
del (näiteks Horvaatia ja Rumeenia puhul aastatel 2004–2006) ilmnenud 
poliitilistest huvidest tingitud süsteemseid moonutusi, mis kokkuvõttes mõjuta-
sid ka lõplikke laienemisotsuseid. Järelikult on laienemiseelse positiivse tingi-
muslikkuse eesmärgid lõplike laienemisotsuste tegemisel viimasel viiel aastal 
vaheldunud: varasemalt trendiks olnud politiseeritud otsustamise ja institut-
sionaalsete huvide mõju on kasvanud ning mõõdetava arengu (Kopenhaageni 
Kriteeriumite osas) osatähtsus vähenenud. 
Viies artikkel (“Navigating between Policy and Populace: Estonia, its 
Accession Referendum and the EU Convention”) käsitles EL-i integratsiooni ja 
laienemiseelse tingimuslikkuse mõju sihtriigi poliitikate kujunemisele juhtumi-
analüüsi kaudu. Uurimus keskendus Eesti Vabariigi poliitilise eliidi prioriteetide 
kujundamisele EL-i liitumiskõneluste ja Euroopa Tulevikukonvendiga kattuval 
tegevusperioodil. Artikkel tõi välja väikeste kandidaatriikide puhul siseriikliku 
ressursside jaotumise olulisuse ja määravuse Euroopa integratsiooni küsimustes. 
Nii selgub, et kõikides kandidaatriikides universaalselt kasutatav positiivne 
tingimuslikkus toob väikeriikides kaasa täiendava surve poliitilisele ja administ-
ratiivsele eliidile ning asub ressursse ära tõmbama teistest poliitika vald-
kondadest. Seega seisavad väikesed kandidaatriigid ühinemiseelses olukorras 
dilemma ees, kas leppida madalama efektiivsusega EL-i positiivse tingimus-
likkuse täitmisel või madalama võimekusega EL-i poliitikaga mitteseotud 
riikliku poliitika valdkondades. 
Kuues artikkel (“Life in Post-Communist Eastern Europe after the EU Member-
ship: Estonia”) hindas tagasivaateliselt positiivse tingimuslikkuse mõju siht-
riikidele tingimuslikkuse lõppemise järel, kasutades näitena Eesti Vabariigi 
sotsiaal-majanduslikku arengut aastatel 1991–2011, ning võrreldes Eesti 
arenguid teiste viiendas ja kuuendas EL-i laienemisvoorus liitunud Kesk- ja Ida-
Euroopa riikidega. Uurimus hindas ka positiivse tingimuslikkuse võimet val-
mistada kandidaatriike ette edukaks liikmelisuseks. Uurimistulemused näitavad, 
et EL-i positiivse tingimuslikkuse järgimine ja kriteeriumite täitmine oli Eesti 
puhul rahvuslik prioriteet. Eesti poolt reformiperioodil tehtud valikuid saab 
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ühelt poolt näha edu toovatena, kuid eelkõige on need olnud eristuvad ja radi-
kaalsed, võrreldes teiste kandidaatriikidega. Selle tulemusel asetus Eesti 2010 
aasta lõpuks enamike EL-i liikmesriikide sotsiaal-majanduslike arenguid kajas-
tavate edetabelite esimestel või viimastel kohtadel, mille keskseks ühendavaks 
nimetajaks on olnud kiire ja kohanduv majandusareng ühes vähese tähelepanu 
osutamisega sotsiaalsele arengule. 
Summeerides doktoritöös kasutatud artiklite uurimistulemused, saab välja 
tuua järgmised olulised aspektid. Esiteks, positiivse tingimuslikkuse intensiivne 
kasutamine laienemispoliitika keskse instrumendina aastatel 1993–2006 oli era-
kordne nii oma mõju, komplekssuse, kui ka tähtsuse osas, arvestades seda, et 
varasemad laienemised ei sisaldanud mõjuvaid positiivse tingimuslikkuse kom-
ponente ning, et lähitulevikus aset leidvad laienemised, saavad üha enam põhi-
nema poliitilisel valikul. 
 Teiseks, laienemistingimuslikkuse eesmärgid ja väärtused on olnud pidevas 
arengus: kui esimestes laienemisringides domineerisid neo-funktsionalistlikud 
huvid, siis järgnevate laienemiste käigus kasvas esmalt valitsustevahelise 
mudeli mõju ning viimased kaks laienemisringi on toonud kaasa neo-liberaalse 
imperialismi ja neo-institutsionalismi mõju kasvu. See omakorda on tinginud 
laienemispoliitika praktilise teostamise eemaldumise varem domineerinud neo-
funktsionaalsest loogikast, mille tulemusel muutuvad laienemiskriteeriumid 
edaspidi pigem vähem läbipaistvateks ja rohkem poliitilisteks. 
Kolmandaks, positiivse tingimuslikkuse kasutamise perioodil on enamik 
kandidaatriike arenenud kiiremini ja stabiilsemalt, kui EL keskmiselt. Siiski ei 
ole kandidaatriikide statistilistes näitajates ilmnenud erakordseid edasiminekuid 
ja mitmed riigid on arenenud ka EL-i keskmisest aeglasemalt. Nii olid viies ja 
kuues laienemisring EL-i ajaloo pikima kestusega ja pärast rohkem kui 10 aastat 
kestnud tingimuslikkuse perioodi olid Bulgaaria ja Rumeenia endiselt vae-
seimad liitujad EL-i ajaloos. Kui viienda laienemisringi käigus nähti positiivset 
tingimuslikkust kandidaatriikide universaalse ja efektiivse kaasamismeetodina, 
siis probleemide ilmnemine positiivse tingimuslikkuse kasutamisel viitab 
sihtriikide motiveeritusele kui kesksele riskitegurile selle meetme õnnestumisel. 
Viienda laienemisvooru edu tagasid pigem erakordselt koostöövalmid 
kandidaatriigid kui positiivse tingimuslikkuse tingimusteta rakendamine. 
Struktureeritud ja tehnilisel hindamisel põhineva positiivse tingimuslikkuse 
ideel on viimastel aastatel olnud aina vähem toetajaid ning mudeli tulevik näib 
olevat vähelubav. Ühelt poolt on laienemispoliitika ise muutumas politiseerituks 
ning mõõdetava progressi näitamine täidab üksnes osalist rolli lõplikes 
laienemisotsustes. Teisalt on täna vaid Horvaatial reaalne liitumisperspektiiv. 
Eelnevast tulenevalt vajab positiivne tingimuslikkus EL-i laienemispoliitika 
osana praktiliseks edasikestmiseks instrumentaariumi arendamist ja reformi-
mist, kuivõrd tänasel kujul ei ole see olemasolevatele sihtriikidele motiveeriv 
ega paku ka EL-le oodatavat tulemuslikkust kandidaatriikide liitumisvalmiduse 
loomeks. 
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